Scholarship Repository
University of Minnesota Law School
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2014

Make No Little Plans: Response to Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent
Law of Private Law Remedies
Tom Cotter
University of Minnesota Law School, cotte034@umn.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/faculty_articles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Tom Cotter, Make No Little Plans: Response to Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of Private Law
Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 25 (2014), available at https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/
faculty_articles/836.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in the Faculty Scholarship collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Texas Law Review
See Also
Volume 92

Response
Make No Little Plans: Response to Ted Sichelman,
Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies
Thomas F. Cotter*
Make no little plans; they have no magic to stir men’s blood and
probably themselves will not be realized. Make big plans; aim high in hope
and work, remembering that a noble, logical diagram once recorded will
never die, but long after we are gone will be a living thing, asserting itself
with ever-growing insistency.
—Attributed to Daniel H. Burnham (1846–1912)1
I.

Introduction

I’d like to think that Daniel Burnham—were he still alive at the ripe old
age of 167 and at all interested in patent law—would admire Ted
Sichelman’s paper Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies,2 which
argues that courts should abandon the conventional view of patents as private
rights for which private-law remedies are appropriate, and instead should
award damages and injunctions only when, and to the extent that, doing so

* Briggs and Morgan Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
1. See 2 CHARLES MOORE, DANIEL H. BURNHAM, ARCHITECT, PLANNER OF CITIES 147 (1921)
(attributing the above quotation to Burnham). But see Phil Rosenthal, Economic Plans Show
Burnham’s Point Not Lost on Chicago, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 7, 2012, http://articles.
chicagotribune.com/2012-03-07/business/ct-biz-0307-phil-20120307_1_comprehensive-plan-smallplans-big-plans (noting some debate as to whether Burnham “ever actually uttered” the quotation).
As recounted in, among many other sources, Erik Larson’s bestselling The Devil in the White City:
Murder, Magic, and Madness at the Fair that Changed America (2004), Burnham was a renowned
architect, urban planner, and director of works for the 1893 World’s Columbian Exposition in
Chicago.
2. 92 TEXAS L. REV. 517 (2014).
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serves the public interest for which patents are granted in the first place. At
first blush, this may not seem such a radical thesis, given the widespread
view that patents derive their justification not from some basis in natural law
or morality but rather from the desire to promote social welfare by
encouraging investment in innovation.3 And in some ways it isn’t, as I will
argue below; some of Sichelman’s specific recommendations are well within
the mainstream of contemporary patent scholarship, even if the courts have
yet to completely catch up. Taken to its logical conclusion, however,
Sichelman’s thesis suggests that (at least in an ideal world) courts should
award monetary relief for patent infringement so as to align ex ante
incentives with ex post rewards; this could mean awarding either more or less
than would be necessary to restore the patentee to the position it would have
occupied but for the infringement (the traditional benchmark for
compensatory damages). Although I remain skeptical that such a system
could ever work in the real world, Sichelman defends his thesis with
aplomb—and recognizes its practical infeasibility in the near term.4
Nevertheless, his analysis suggests that at least in industries in which patents
are unlikely to play a major role in inducing invention, disclosure, or
commercialization, efforts to ensure that defendants restore patentees to the
position they would have occupied but for the infringement may not be worth
the candle; some risk of undercompensation may be more tolerable than is
commonly assumed.5 I will suggest that this implication, if valid, possibly
could have some practical payoff even in the short run.
Part II summarizes a framework for patent remedies that I have
developed, partly in conjunction with Roger Blair, in previous work. Part III
focuses on the areas over which Sichelman and I are in agreement and Part
IV on the areas of disagreement. Notwithstanding the latter, I find
Sichelman’s analysis insightful and thought provoking—even for those of us
who are content to occupy ourselves with somewhat “littler” plans.
II. A Framework for Patent Remedies
Because I’ve written more about patent remedies than any other
subject,6 I think it best initially to summarize my views so that my areas of
agreement and disagreement with Sichelman will be clearer.
3. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The copyright law, like the patent
statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.” (quoting United States v.
Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Thomas F.
Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and Intellectual Property Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE
COMMON LAW 211, 217 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., forthcoming 2013).
4. Sichelman, supra note 2, at 555–64.
5. Id. at 523–24.
6. See ROGER D. BLAIR & THOMAS F. COTTER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: ECONOMIC AND
LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES (2005); THOMAS F. COTTER, COMPARATIVE
PATENT REMEDIES: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (2013) [hereinafter COTTER,
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First, with regard to the choice between awarding injunctions or
prospective damages for patent infringement, I have argued that in general
injunctive relief is preferable because the parties (patentee and infringer/user)
are likely to have better information than a court concerning the patent’s
economic value (that is, the patent’s ability to reduce costs or increase profits
in comparison with the next-best available noninfringing alternative).7 Put
another way, the interest in reducing information, error, and adjudicative
costs counsels in favor of a general rule that courts award the prevailing
patentee a permanent injunction.8 Nevertheless, there may be cases in which
the sum of these expected costs is less than the social cost of awarding an
injunction. In particular, where the social costs of denying access to the
patented invention are very high (as may be the case, for example, when the
patent reads on an essential medicine), or when the conditions giving rise to
patent holdup are present (e.g., when the patent reads on a component of a
multicomponent device, the ex ante value of the patent is substantially less
than the ex post cost of designing around it, and the infringement is
inadvertent), the general preference in favor of injunctive relief arguably
should give way and the court should award damages, in the form of a
prospective (ongoing) royalty, instead.9
Second, with regard to damages (either for past infringement or, in a
case in which the court denies a permanent injunction, for future use as well),
at least as a first approximation, the guiding principle should be to render the
patentee no worse off and the infringer no better off than either would have
been absent the infringement.10 In practice, this means awarding the patentee
the greater of its own lost profit, if any, resulting from the infringement or
the royalty the parties would have negotiated ex ante had they believed the
COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES]; Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of
Damages Rules in Intellectual Property Law, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1585 (1998) [hereinafter
Blair & Cotter, IP Damages]; Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Rethinking Patent Damages, 10
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1 (2001); Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Enhanced Damages
and Attorney’s Fees for Willful Patent Infringement, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 291 (2005); Thomas F.
Cotter, Four Principles for Calculating Reasonable Royalties in Patent Infringement Litigation, 27
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 725 (2011); Thomas F. Cotter, The International
Trade Commission: Reform or Abolition? A Comment on Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley,
Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 43 (2013); Thomas F.
Cotter, Patent Remedies and Practical Reason, 88 TEXAS L. REV. SEE ALSO 125 (2009); Thomas F.
Cotter, Reining in Remedies in Patent Litigation: Three (Increasingly Immodest) Proposals, 30
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Cotter, Reining In],
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2235769. To avoid an excess of citations in the following
footnotes, wherever possible I will cite only to my most recent comprehensive work on remedies—
COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES, supra—rather than to the other works listed above.
7. See, e.g., Blair & Cotter, IP Damages, supra note 6, at 1589, 1615–16 (concluding that
intellectual property rights are more efficiently protected in a property rules regime where parties
may negotiate directly, as opposed to a liability rules regime where a court sets damages).
8. See, e.g., COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES, supra note 6, at 53–55.
9. See id. at 55–62.
10. See id. at 63.
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patent to be both valid and infringed.11 The rationale is that this principle
preserves the patent incentive by restoring the patentee to the position it
would have occupied had the infringer either avoided infringement or
obtained a license.12 (Whether preserving the patent incentive is such a great
idea is another matter, but I have argued that in awarding damages courts
should take the desirability of preserving the patent incentive as a given.13
I’ll return to this point in Part IV below.) In response to the argument that
such a rule may encourage infringement by sometimes rendering the
infringer no worse off for having infringed—and thus may discourage the ex
ante licensing negotiations that would conserve on information, error, and
adjudicative costs—I would note that (1) the infringer is generally worse off
for having to defend itself in a patent infringement lawsuit rather than
negotiating a license ex ante, and (2) courts can ensure that the infringer is at
least marginally worse off by (a) enhancing damages in an appropriate
amount or (b) requiring the infringer to pay the prevailing patentee some
portion of the latter’s attorneys’ fees.14
With respect to damages
enhancements in particular, however, courts also need to avoid the risk of
overdeterrence: that is, if the penalty for infringing is too high, manufacturers
may steer farther than is really necessary to avoid any risk of infringement,
the result being that patent scope is de facto enlarged.15 Thus, as a general
rule, I have argued that courts should award damages enhancements only
when necessary to achieve optimal deterrence. For example, if the
probability of a certain type of infringement being detected is only 1/3, an
award of treble damages will provide the correct incentive for similarlysituated defendants to avoid infringing.16

11. See id. at 63–64.
12. See id. at 64–65.
13. See id. at 49–50.
14. See id. at 69, 72–73, 145–48. In the United States, the general rule is that each party bears
its own attorneys’ fees absent exceptional circumstances (such as willful infringement). Id. at 147.
Most other countries generally award the prevailing party some or all of its attorneys’ fees as a
matter of course. Id. As for enhanced damages, U.S. courts are authorized to award enhancements
up to three times the actual damages sustained, but again only in cases of willful infringement. Id.
at 140. Except for Australia and Canada, most other countries do not permit enhanced or punitive
damages in patent cases, although some do permit moderate damages increases to make up for the
fact that the infringer avoids some of the costs and risks that willing licensees typically incur. See
id. at 209–11, 269–70, 275–76, 327–28, 360, 370–72.
15. See id. at 64–65.
16. See id. at 72–73. In reality, the probability of detection cannot easily be quantified, but
courts applying the above rule may decide to enhance damages in cases in which, for example, the
defendant took pains to conceal its infringement.
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III. Where Sichelman and I Agree
With the above framework in mind, it appears that Sichelman and I
agree more than we disagree on the features that would comprise an optimal
system of patent remedies. In particular:
1. We both agree that courts should not award permanent injunctions where
the risk of patent holdup is high, and that that risk may be present
whether the patentee is a manufacturing or a nonmanufacturing patent
owner.17 My only caveat is that we shouldn’t lose sight of the economic
rationale for (ordinarily) preferring injunctive relief: that it conserves on
information, error, and adjudication costs by leaving it to the parties,
rather than a court, to determine how much the patent is worth. The
point is simply that sometimes that rationale should give way to other,
stronger countervailing concerns (i.e., holdup). The ultimate decision
should be a matter of economics and not (as Sichelman rightly notes)18
blind adherence to tort- or property-law models.
2. We both agree that supracompensatory damages may be optimal where
detection is difficult, and that (contrary to current law) an award of
supracompensatory damages therefore should not be premised on a
finding of willfulness.19
3. Sichelman also proposes that where the transaction costs of licensing are
higher than the value of a proposed use, that use should not result in an
award of injunctive relief.20 I have no quarrel with this principle, which
sounds very much like one of the leading rationales for the fair use
doctrine in copyright.21 Indeed, I have suggested in other work22 that it
may be a good idea for patent law to adopt some sort of fair use doctrine,
as Maureen O’Rourke proposed several years ago23 (and Katherine
Strandburg more recently,24 as Sichelman acknowledges).25 Whether
such a doctrine, if premised only on a transaction-cost-reduction

17. See Sichelman, supra note 2, at 522–23, 541–54.
18. See id. at 536–39.
19. See id. at 525–26, 558.
20. See id. at 556.
21. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of
the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982); see also Thomas F.
Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1271, 1277–78 (2008).
22. Indeed, I have previously suggested that adopting some sort of fair use doctrine in patent
law, along the lines that other scholars have advocated, may well have merit. E.g., Thomas F.
Cotter, Four Questionable Rationales for the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
457, 468–69 (2011).
23. See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 1177 (2000) (proposing a patent fair use doctrine that would require potential users to pay a
royalty rather than, as in copyright, avoiding liability altogether).
24. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Patent Fair Use 2.0, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 265 (2011).
25. See Sichelman, supra note 2, at 558 n.200.
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rationale, would have more than limited applicability in practice
nevertheless is an open question.
4. Finally—and most significantly for the following part—I agree that
market rewards are not always proportionate to investments in research
and development (R&D).26 The question is what, if anything, to do with
this insight in practice.
IV. Where We Differ
The main point on which we differ is Sichelman’s most provocative,
namely his suggestion that courts sometimes should modify damages awards
to better align the costs and benefits of patent protection.27 To his credit,
Sichelman recognizes some problems with this recommendation, among

26. See id. at 523–24.
27. See id. at 557 (“[W]hen R & D costs and risks are low and deadweight losses and rentseeking costs are high—injunctions should be routinely denied and damages reduced when the
potential error costs of doing so are low.”). I have a few other minor quibbles, which I may as well
note here. First, at page 550–51, Sichelman presents a hypothetical in which the damages a
licensing patentee would recover against an infringer are smaller than the damages a manufacturing
patentee would recover for the very same act of infringement. Sichelman suggests that the disparity
in recovery makes no sense, but in my view, one would expect the patentee (ex ante) to take the
path that promised the higher return—licensing or manufacturing—and to recover accordingly. In
other words, a patentee who chose to license rather than manufacture presumably didn’t have the
capacity to manufacture at a scale that would have earned him higher profits than he would have
earned from licensing. See generally COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES, supra note 6, at
44–45, 63–64. In addition, at page 555–56, Sichelman presents a hypothetical in which the patented
invention increases marginal profit from $2 to $3 per article. If I understand this hypothetical
correctly, $2 per article is the upper limit of the normal rate of return on capital, since “competitors
could earn slightly less than 2% profit margins by making other products.” Id. at 555. The
economic profit, therefore, prior to introduction of the patent, is only incrementally above zero. See,
e.g., Michael Abramowicz, An Industrial Organization Approach to Copyright Law, 46 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 33, 51 & n.48 (2004) (noting that “[z]ero economic profit corresponds to a normal
rate of return on investments of capital and labor,” because “‘economic profit’ is ‘[t]he amount by
which total revenues exceed total opportunity cost’”) (quoting ROBERT B. EKELUND, JR. & ROBERT
D. TOLLISON, ECONOMICS G-6 (4th ed. 1994)). Prior to introduction of the patent, there were ten
competitors each selling 100,000 articles at a price of $100. The patentee can exclude its nine
competitors by pricing at just below $100. Then it can sell a million units (the patentee must have
had a lot of excess capacity!) and earn a profit of $3 million. If the nine competitors infringed and
each sold 100,000 units at (just under?) $100, the patentee could sue and recover, in the aggregate,
just under $2,700,000. Sichelman views this recovery as excessive, since the value of the infringing
component was only $100,000 per competitor (not $300,000). His broader point, again if I
understand correctly, is that courts should (but don’t) reduce the patentee’s lost profit by the amount
the patentee earned or could have earned on capital that was not used to produce patented articles
but that would have been so used but for the infringement. See COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT
REMEDIES, supra note 6, at 110 n.139 (discussing my views on an earlier version of Sichelman’s
argument). I’m not sure this is such a damning point, however. First, it’s not entirely clear to me
that a court would be averse to making an appropriate deduction if the defendant properly raised this
argument and presented evidence to substantiate it. Second, whatever the theoretical merits of
Sichelman’s argument may be, I question whether taking this additional nuance into account, in
what is already a very complex undertaking, would be worth the additional adjudicative cost. See
id.
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them that it might seem to violate separation-of-power principles by
authorizing courts effectively to underenforce patents, and that courts will
lack perfect information from which to determine if R&D costs and rewards
are properly aligned.28 He suggests that the first problem (one that I have
noted in my scholarship as well29) could be overcome if Congress explicitly
“provide[d] the courts with such discretion,”30 which I suppose is right—
though I wouldn’t recommend holding one’s breath until that eventuality
arises. As for the second problem, Sichelman’s main point, as I understand
it, is that the ex post nature of the inquiry makes it somewhat easier for a
court to compare R&D costs with social benefits than for the Patent Office
(or other actors) to do so ex ante.31 Tailoring remedies ex post, in other
words, might be easier than tailoring rights ex ante.32 In any event, in the
short term all that Sichelman proposes is that courts
can arguably determine at least when the social costs from injunctions
and make-whole damages are substantial compared with the social
benefits of the invention. For instance, courts can hear evidence on
R&D, testing, and commercialization costs (including the cost of
failures); technological and market risk; increased profits vs. baseline
profits; the value of other patented components; the value of noninfringing alternatives, and so forth, in order to determine when
injunctions and make-whole damages might lead to grossly excessive
awards.33
In the longer run, however, Sichelman believes that courts might be able
to develop workable standards for determining damages that are
proportionate to R&D costs in a wider range of cases.34
Maybe so—but I remain unconvinced. (For similar reasons, I also
doubt the practicality of Sichelman’s related recommendation that, in an
ideal world, courts would award supracompensatory damages, payable by the
government, in cases in which compensatory damages understimulate
invention.35) Patent law is complicated and expensive as it is; anything that

28. See Sichelman, supra note 2, at 560. Sichelman also notes that his proposal would increase
uncertainty, but adds that (1) even under the current system, “awarding remedies is anything but an
exact science” and (2) uncertainty would be limited if any deviation from make-whole remedies is
limited to cases in which those remedies “are clearly economically inferior . . . .” Id. at 562.
29. See COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES, supra note 6, at 49–51.
30. Sichelman, supra note 2, at 562.
31. Cf. id. at 565 (explaining how courts can, upon hearing evidence on, inter alia, R&D and
the social benefits of an invention, find the appropriate remedy “without too much labor or error”).
32. See id. at 526 (“When the cost of particularized substantive rulemaking is high, as in the
case of patent law, particularized enforcement, procedure, and remedies may provide a better route
for achieving optimal outcomes.”).
33. Id. at 565.
34. See id. at 565–69.
35. See id. at 526, 559. This proposal calls to mind another proposal made recently in Anup
Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, 101 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming
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makes it even more complex and expensive is likely to generate additional
consequences that may be difficult to foresee.36 Would the wealthier party to
a patent dispute have an even greater advantage than is currently the case if
courts were to incorporate this additional level of analysis into the law of
remedies? Would the system be susceptible to gaming? Would juries be
expected to make these sorts of determinations—and if not, is there a way
around the Seventh Amendment?37 With so many problems besetting the
current patent system, is it prudent to devote precious political capital to a
reform of this nature? And if we were to develop confidence, over time, that
certain classes of inventions rarely if ever need much in the way of R&D
recoupment, why not simply eliminate them from the scope of patentable
subject matter (or make use of other doctrinal tools, such as reducing the
patent term) and be done with it?38
Sichelman’s analysis nevertheless might suggest that courts need not
always overexert themselves to restore the status quo ante as accurately as
possible. In cases involving standard-essential patents, for example, one
might conclude that widespread adoption and use may be sufficient to ensure
the patentee a reward adequate to cover R&D—without the need for courts to
perfectly estimate the amount necessary to restore the status quo ante or to be
overly worried about the possible negative consequences of denying
injunctive relief.39 (I have previously made an analogous observation about

2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2216948. Malani and Masur argue, among other
things, that patentees who survive validity challenges should receive an additional reward, either in
terms of a monetary recovery payable by the government or a patent term extension. Id.
(manuscript at 39–44). (Analogously, prevailing challengers should recover a multiple of their own
attorneys’ fees.) See id. (manuscript at 44–45). In Malani and Masur’s model, raising the stakes of
litigation in this manner would encourage patent owners to file suit only in meritorious cases. Id.
(manuscript at 31). As Norman Siebrasse has pointed out to me, however, determining the correct
amount by which to multiply the prevailing patentee’s reward depends crucially on the rate of
judicial error. See id. (manuscript at 42). Faced with the difficulty of estimating what this rate is,
Malani and Masur respond that one could set the amount legislatively, see id. (manuscript at 42
n.121), or rely upon panels of experts to review random samples of patent cases, see id. (manuscript
at 57). Like Professor Siebrasse, I find this latter suggestion unrealistic.
36. See AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 35 (2011)
(reporting that the median cost of litigating a patent infringement suit with less than $1 million at
risk through to judgment as of 2011 is estimated to be $650,000; for a suit with up to $25 million at
risk, $2.5 million; and for a suit with over $25 million at risk, $5 million).
37. Maybe. For a discussion, see Cotter, Reining In, supra note 6 (manuscript at 119–27).
38. Though I suppose TRIPs could make this option difficult, depending on what counts as a
“field of technology.” See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art.
27(1), Apr. 15, 1994, 108 Stat. 4814, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (stating that, in general, “patents shall be
available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology,” and that
“patents shall be available and patent rights enjoyable without discrimination as to . . . the field of
technology”); id. art. 33 (“The term of protection available shall not end before the expiration of a
period of twenty years counted from the filing date.”).
39. See Cotter, Reining In, supra note 6 (manuscript at 111).
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IP rights that generate substantial network effects.40) Put another way, the
law of patent remedies is, in my view, all about tradeoffs: specifically, the
tradeoff between accuracy (quantifying the patent owner’s injury as
accurately as possible) and adjudicative costs.41 Perhaps in cases involving
standard-essential patents or patents enabling network effects, courts could
conserve on adjudicative costs and preserve an adequate incentive by
adopting relatively simple rules that err, if at all, on the side of
undercompensation. I admit that this is all a bit speculative, though, and
upon further consideration any such proposal might still give rise to
separation-of-powers or rule-of-law critiques. But in spirit it is not altogether
foreign to the more far-reaching proposal Sichelman advances in his paper.
V. Conclusion
In the spirit of Daniel Burnham, Sichelman makes no little plans, and
for this he is to be commended. Sichelman has produced an intriguing and
thought-provoking paper, much of which I find quite persuasive. Our
principal disagreement rests on our respective assessments of the magnitude
of the practical problems that the more creative aspects of Sichelman’s
scheme would generate. I hope that Sichelman and I will continue a fruitful
dialogue on the relative merits of various adjustments to the law of patent
remedies in future work, and that courts and other policymakers will give
consideration to his thoughtful analysis.

40. See Thomas F. Cotter, The Procompetitive Interest in Intellectual Property Law, 48 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 483, 530 (2006).
41. See COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES, supra note 6, at 37–38, 65.

